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Abstract
Background: Computer keyboards and mice are potential reservoirs of nosocomial pathogens,
but routine disinfection for non-water-proof computer devices is a problem. With better hand
hygiene compliance of health-care workers (HCWs), the impact of these potential sources of
contamination on clinical infection needs to be clarified.
Methods: This study was conducted in a 1600-bed medical center of southern Taiwan with 47
wards and 282 computers. With education and monitoring program of hand hygiene for HCWs,
the average compliance rate was 74% before our surveillance. We investigated the association of
methicillin-resistant  Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA),  Pseudomonas aeruginosa and  Acinetobacter
baumannii, three leading hospital-acquired pathogens, from ward computer keyboards, mice and
from clinical isolates in non-outbreak period by pulsed field gel electrophoresis and antibiogram.
Results: Our results revealed a 17.4% (49/282) contamination rate of these computer devices by
S. aureus, Acinetobacter spp. or Pseudomonas spp. The contamination rates of MRSA and A. baumannii
in the ward computers were 1.1% and 4.3%, respectively. No P. aeruginosa was isolated. All isolates
from computers and clinical specimens at the same ward showed different pulsotypes. However,
A. baumannii isolates on two ward computers had the same pulsotype.
Conclusion: With good hand hygiene compliance, we found relatively low contamination rates of
MRSA, P. aeruginosa and A. baumannii on ward computer interface, and without further contribution
to nosocomial infection. Our results suggested no necessity of routine culture surveillance in non-
outbreak situation.
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Background
In developed countries, computers are used in the bedside
area for multiple functions, including ordering, checking
laboratory and image results, recording patients' condi-
tions, and accounting. Moreover, most computer devices,
such as keyboards and mice, in many countries are not
water-proof and not specially designed for hospital disin-
fection needs. Therefore, there is a good possibility that
computer interface surfaces may serve as reservoirs for
nosocomial pathogens. Besides, the rate of hand washing
compliance in healthcare institutions is low (~40%),
which is presumably related to the contamination of
inanimate surfaces of medical equipments and hospital
environment with nosocomial pathogens [1]. Studies
have shown that the hands or gloves of healthcare workers
(HCWs) can be contaminated after touching inanimate
objects in patient rooms or after touching environmental
surfaces near patients [2-4].
One study reported that microbial contamination of com-
puter interface surfaces was so prevalent that various
microorganisms were isolated from more than 50% of the
keyboards of hospital computers [5]. The levels of con-
tamination varied with the proximity to the patients, the
texture of inanimate surfaces and the frequency of contact.
The hospital ward computer is found being less likely to
be contaminated than bedside computers [6]. Schultz et
al. have reported that 95% of keyboards in close proximity
to patient sites had bacterial contamination. However,
only 5% of these were pathogens known to be associated
with nosocomial transmission [7]. Most previous studies
have reported the contamination of computer interface
surfaces by potential pathogens such as Methicillin-resist-
ant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) [3,8]and Acinetobacter
baumannii  [9], but few have studied the relationship
between contamination of the ward computers and clini-
cal isolates in hospitals with improved hand hygiene com-
pliance and during a non-outbreak period. Clinically, A.
baumannii, P. aeruginosa, and MRSA cause the most com-
mon nosocomial infections and their presence correlates
with environmental surface contamination [10-12]. We
conducted a hospital-based surveillance study of these
three important pathogens on computer interface surfaces
in different ward settings and then examined the relation-
ship of contaminated computer interface surfaces with the
presence of clinical isolates in these wards during a non-
outbreak period.
Methods
We conducted a cross-sectional surveillance for S. aureus,
Pseudomonas species and Acinetobacter species on the key-
boards and mice of computers in all ward stations of
Kaohsiung Medical University Hospital, a 1600-bed terti-
ary referral hospital that contained various speciality
departments, in July 2006. The three organisms are
among the most common causes of nosocomial infection
in the study site where Vancomycin resistant enterococcus
(VRE) accounted for less than 1% enterococcus clinical
isolates. Clinical isolates of MRSA, P. aeruginosa, and A.
baumannii were recovered two weeks before or after the
day of the cross-sectional surveillance, when computer-
associated bacteria were collected. We selected clinical
and computer isolates of the same species in the same
ward for comparison by antibiograms and pulsed field gel
electrophoresis (PFGE) typing.
All medical records and ordering systems were computer-
ized in this hospital. No routine disinfection protocol had
been established for computer equipment. The keyboards
were not covered. No routine cleaning for the surfaces of
computer interfaces was performed. Hand hygiene com-
pliance has been continuously educated and monitored
every three months with method as previously described
[13] by members in infection control room and the
department of nursing. Every week, HCWs' hand hygiene
compliance was monitored for 30 minutes in each ward.
The mean of the rates from four times of monitoring was
regarded as the hand hygiene compliance rate of every
ward.
A sterile swab (CultureSwab Transport System, Difco,
Detroit, MI) moistened with sterile saline solution was
moved over the keys of keyboards and the buttons of
computer mice. Then the swabs were added to brain heart
infusion broth medium for 48 h at 37°C. The inoculated
broth was subcultured onto blood agar plates (BBL, Cock-
eysville, MD, USA) and Mac-Conkey agar plates (BBL,
Cockeysville, MD, USA). Organisms were identified using
standard methods and the API Identification System
(bioMe'rieux, Marcy l'Etoile, France). Isolates of Pseu-
domonas and Acinetobacter were identified to species level.
We used the coagulase test (Coagulase Plasma System;
Difco) to identify S. aureus strains. MRSA was preliminar-
ily detected by its characteristic growth on mannitol salt
agar supplemented with oxacillin (4 μg/mL). All sus-
pected MRSA isolates were inoculated onto Mueller-Hin-
ton agar (Becton Dickinson Microbiology Systems)
supplemented with 6 μg/ml oxacillin and 4% NaCl. Iso-
lates identified as P. aeruginosa, A. baumannii, and MRSA
were further tested for antimicrobial susceptibility and for
PFGE typing.
Antimicrobial susceptibility was determined by the agar
diffusion method, according to the CLSI guideline [14].
Pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) was performed as
described previously [15,16]. Restriction enzymes were
used for identification, SmaI for MRSA and ApaI for Aci-
netobacter spp. The band patterns were visually compared
and classified as indistinguishable (no difference), closely
related (clonal variants, one to three band differences),BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:164 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/164
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possibly related (four to six band differences), and unre-
lated (more than six band differences), according to the
criteria previously described [17]. To identify PFGE poly-
morphisms, each sample was analyzed by Molecular Ana-
lyst Fingerprinting, Fingerprinting Plus, and
Fingerprinting DST Software (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Rich-
mond, CA, USA). After calculation of similarities for every
pair of organisms using Pearson correlation coefficients,
we used the grouping method to deduce a dendrogram
from the matrix via the Unweighted Pair Group Method
using Arithmetic Average (UPGMA) clustering technique.
Statistics were run with SPSS software version 13.0 (SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). P values were calculated by the
Chi-Square test for categorical variables. All tests were
two-tailed, and p < 0.05 was considered significant.
Results
We screened 282 computer samples that each had a key-
boards and a mouse device in 47 ward stations for S.
aureus, Pseudomonas spp. and Acinetobacter spp. Twelve of
the ward stations were from intensive care units (ICUs)
and 35 were from Non-ICU wards One hundred and
forty-four samples were from ICU computers and 420
from ward computers. All nurse stations had six desktop
computers, one for accounting, one for radiological
images, and four for ordering and laboratory data check-
ing. Although the computers for accounting were mainly
operated by accountants without direct contact with
patients, the other HCWs accessed these computers occa-
sionally when the accountants were off duty. The average
compliance rate was 74% in the month that the cross-sec-
tional surveillance on computer underwent. There was no
significant difference on compliance rates among wards.
Before final species identification, we found 18 isolates of
S. aureus, 17 isolates of Pseudomonas spp., and 22 isolates
of Acinetobacter spp. from 49 computer interface samples.
Three computers had positive isolation from both key-
board and mouse device. Five computer interfaces had
two different species identified. The overall computer con-
tamination rate of the above three organisms is 17.4%
(49/282).
For Acinetobacter isolates, 12 were A. baumannii, 7 were A.
lwoffii, and 3 were A. junii. For S. aureus isolates, 3 were
MRSA and 15 were MSSA. For Pseudomonas isolates, there
were 12 P. putida isolates, 1 P. alcaligenes, 4 P. stutzeri, but
none was P. aeruginosa. The computer contamination rate
for  A. baumannii was 4.3% (12/282) and the rate for
MRSA was 1.1% (3/282) (Table 1). The combined con-
tamination rate of either MRSA or A. baumannii is 5.3%
(15/282).
There was no significant difference about contamination
rate by any of S. aureus, Pseudomonas spp. and Acinetobacter
spp. between non-ICU (16.7%, 35/210) and ICU (19.4%,
14/72) computers (p = 0.591) and between accounting,
radiology and order computers (p = 0.699). When the
radiology and order computers were grouped together
into the "clinical use" category, there was no significant
difference in the contamination rate between accounting
(10/47) and "clinical use" (39/235) computers (p = 0.
439). No significant higher rate of contamination of any
of the above three between keyboard and mouse (p  =
0.474) but there is a trend that the occurrence of keyboard
contamination is associated with the occurrence of mouse
device contamination (p = 0.054) by McNemar test.
When only considering MRSA, P. aeruginosa, and A. bau-
mannii, all the differences between non-ICU and ICU
computers (p = 0.476), keyboard and mouse specimens (p
= 0.191), and accounting and "clinical use" computers (p
= 0.722), were not significant (Table 2).
Twenty isolates of A. baumannii, 34 isolates of MRSA, and
97 isolates of P. aeruginosa were identified from clinical
specimens in the same hospital two weeks before and
after the computer surveillance day. One MRSA isolate
and two A. baumannii were isolated from patients of the
wards where computer devices were also contaminated
with MRSA and A. baumannii. We compared the clinical
Table 1: Culture results from computer interface surfaces.
Keyboard (+) only Mouse (+) only Both keyboard and mouse 
(+)
Both keyboard and mouse 
(-)
Any of Staphylococcus spp., 
Pseudomonas Spp. and Acinetobacter 
spp.
30 16 3 233
MRSA 2 1 0 279
A. baumannii 84 0 2 7 0
Any of MRSA and A. baumannii 10 5 0 267BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:164 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/164
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and computer isolates by antibiograms and PFGE typing.
The antibiogram results of the A. baumannii isolated from
clinical and computer specimens in ward 18EN were dif-
ferent on fewer than three classes of antimicrobial agents.
For the other groups of MRSA and A. baumannii isolates,
the antibiograms differed in susceptibility by more than
three classes of antimicrobial agents. The PFGE patterns of
computer and clinical isolates in the same ward (MRSA
isolates from ward 8B and A. baumannii isolates from
ward 11CI and 18 EN) were different that had similarity
less than 70% (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). However, interestingly,
two A. baumannii computer isolates from ward 7C and
one A. baumannii computer isolate from ward 15ESI2 had
the same pulsotype (Figure 1).
Discussion
This hospital-based surveillance study indicated the rate
of MRSA and A. baumannii contamination of ward com-
puters was 1.1% and 4.3%, respectively. No computer
device was contaminated by P. aeruginosa. The MRSA con-
Table 2: Culture results of MRSA and A. baumannii isolated from computer interface surfaces according to type of computer interface, 
type of ward, and computer function.
(+) for MRSA or A. bauman-
nii
Keyboard (+) only Mouse (+) only Both keyboard and mouse 
(+)
Both keyboard and mouse 
(-)
Ward function
Non-ICU (N = 210) 6 4 0 200
ICU (N = 72) 4 1 0 67
Computer function
Accounting use (N = 47) 1 2 0 44
Clinical use (N = 235) 9 3 0 223
ICU: intensive care unit
Similarity of PFGE patterns of A. baumannii isolated in hospital wards, calculated by the unweighted pair group method using  arithmetic averages (UPGMA) Figure 1
Similarity of PFGE patterns of A. baumannii isolated in hospital wards, calculated by the unweighted pair group 
method using arithmetic averages (UPGMA). Similarities >70% represent the clonal spread of strains. Isolate number, 
source of specimens and the ward number are listed in the right side of the figure.BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:164 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/164
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tamination rate in our study was lower than that reported
in a UK referral centre (1%) [18], but very different from
that reported for a UK acute district general hospital
(24%) [19]. This difference might be related to differences
in hospital size, extent of computer use, and hand hygiene
compliance. We supposed the relatively good hand
hygiene compliance among our HCWs contributed to the
lower contamination rate, although the two previous
studies did not provide hand hygiene compliance data.
The significant difference in the level of contamination of
ward computers at different hospitals implies that com-
puters can have very different roles as reservoirs of noso-
comial pathogens. Compared with a high rate (37%) of
environmental surfaces in patients' rooms harbor MRSA
sampled from studies during outbreak and non-outbreak
situations [20], ward computer interface surfaces seem to
play a minor role as pathogen reservoirs.
Studies in ICUs indicate a more important role of comput-
ers there as pathogen reservoirs than do the computers of
Non-ICU wards. Two previous studies have shown that
contamination rate of computers in ICU workstations was
as prevalent as that of the computers in patient rooms
[8,21]. Computer interface surfaces in an ICU station were
contaminated with potentially pathogenic microorgan-
isms at a higher rate (6.3%) than the other surfaces [21].
However, for computer interfaces at ward stations, our
results did not reveal a higher contamination rate in ICUs
than that in non-ICUs.
Although contamination of inanimate surfaces by micro-
organisms has long been recognized, its impact on
patients' infections is not clear [22]. The fact that forty-two
percent of personnel had MRSA contamination on their
gloves without entering the rooms of patients with MRSA
infections suggests that contaminated environmental sur-
faces outside infected patients' rooms may increase the
risk of MRSA transmission [3]. The association of clinical
isolates and environmental contamination isolates was
demonstrated for a 9-bed ICU, in which the researchers
used PFGE typing of sequential isolates from clinical and
environmental specimens [23]. An investigation of com-
puter interface devices in an ICU indicated indistinguish-
able strains of MRSA from computers of patients' rooms,
doctors' station, and clinical specimens [8]. Our hospital-
based surveillance of MRSA by PFGE typing did not iden-
tify an association of MRSA isolates from computer inter-
face devices and from patients. It is noteworthy that our
study was different for a significantly lower rate of MRSA
contamination (1.1%) than this previous study (11.1%)
[8]. However, the identity of indistinguishable strains of
A. baumannii from computer devices in two different
wards (Figure 1) suggested the computer as a potential
route of clonal spread in a hospital, although no subse-
quent clinical isolate was of this strain in our study.
Compared with the relatively low MRSA contamination
rate (1.1%) on ward computer interface surfaces in our
study, the 53% MRSA hand contamination rate among
HCWs after contacting environmental surfaces near hos-
pitalized patients in Bhalla A. et al study, showed that
HCW's role as pathogen reservoirs and suggested hand
hygiene to be important [2]. Beside to improve hand-
hygiene compliance, improvement of cleaning services
could be administered as an effective infection control
measure [20]. Disinfectants including chlorine, alcohol,
phenol and quaternary ammonium are all effective
against MRSA, P. aeruginosa, and vancomycin-resistant
Enterococcus species on keyboards of computers; and even
sterile water is effective to remove more than 95% bacteria
[5]. Flat keyboard with an alarm was suggested for being
easy to clean and associated with better cleaning compli-
ance [24]. Although keyboards can be safely and success-
fully disinfected and the need to clean computer interface
surfaces as a routine practice is generally accepted, no spe-
cific cleaning and disinfection frequency and procedure
for computer accessories has been defined [6,25]. Domes-
tic cleaning has been reported useful to control MRSA
[26]. As daily cleaning and hygiene regulation for using
computer were demonstrated to be useful interventions to
reduce keyboard contamination [9], several recommenda-
tions were gradually adopted, including that computers
Similarity of PFGE patterns of MRSA isolated in hospital wards, calculated by UPGMA Figure 2
Similarity of PFGE patterns of MRSA isolated in hospital wards, calculated by UPGMA. Similarities >70% repre-
sent the clonal spread of strains. Isolate number, source of specimens and the ward number are listed in the right side of the 
figure.BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:164 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/164
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should be disinfected daily and when visibly soiled and
HCW should not touch computer keyboards with con-
taminated hands [5]. Our result of the trend for the asso-
ciation of contamination rate of any of S. aureus,
Pseudomonas spp. and Acinetobacter spp on the keyboards
and mouse devices suggested both interface surfaces
required attention when conducting cleaning service.
In contrast to previous studies on the role of environmen-
tal colonization that were performed during nosocomial
pathogen outbreaks [27], our study was conducted when
there was no outbreak. We did not investigate other fac-
tors in the transmission route, such as HCWs' hand car-
riage and colonization of patients. As sporadic MRSA
strains differed in the shorter survival duration on envi-
ronmental surface than outbreak strains [28], our study of
a non-outbreak setting might be associated with the lower
chance to find the similar genotype strains between com-
puter and clinical isolates. Our study result is also limited
by the cross sectional design that no measurement of the
contamination levels was performed at two time periods
with different hand hygiene compliance. Therefore it is
difficult to make a conclusion about hand hygiene could
help to prevent contamination of hospital ward comput-
ers, though inanimate environment surfaces in hospitals
played a role among many steps for the transmission of
pathogen to patients and hand hygiene promotion may
be beneficial to reduce the risk of cross contamination
[29].
Conclusion
Our report documents that the contamination rates of
computer interface surfaces by MRSA, P. aeruginosa, and A.
baumannii in a hospital-wide surveillance were low when
a relatively good hand hygiene compliance of HCWs was
observed. Furthermore, no clinical correlation of contam-
ination of these computer devices to clinical isolates was
found. Routine disinfection and even surveillance of these
computer devices may not be mandatory in non-outbreak
settings.
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